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RICO PATTERN REQUIRES INTERRELATED CONTINUOUS
RACKETEERING ACTS
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985)
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' the United States Supreme Court
swept away two judicially created restrictions on the burgeoning scope of
private civil RICO actions under section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 Nevertheless, the Court
suggested an alternative means for narrowing the scope of civil RICO by
criticizing the lower courts for failing to develop a meaningful interpreta-
tion of a "pattern of racketeering activity,"3 a concept central to the op-
eration of RICO.4
Sedima entered into a joint venture agreement with Imrex to supply a
NATO subcontractor with electronic component parts.5 Sedima secured
the orders for component parts, which Imrex then filled.6 Sedima
brought suit against Imrex, alleging that Imrex fraudulently inflated
purchase orders and other costs associated with the venture.7
The district court dismissed Sedima's civil RICO claim because
Sedima failed to allege a racketeering injury.' On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that a
civil RICO claim requires a prior criminal conviction of the defendant
and an injury of the type that RICO was designed to prevent.9 Finding
the Second Circuit's restrictions unwarranted by the legislative history
1. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 9, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1985)). Section 1964(c) provides as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c).
3. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
5. Id at 3279.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Sedima
alleged that Imrex's use of the mails and the telephone to transmit fraudulent purchase orders con-
stituted an illegal pattern of "racketeering activity." Id. at 964-65.
8. Id. at 965.
9. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
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and the language of the statute, the Supreme Court reversed."t The
Court suggested, however, that courts should look for "continuity" and
"relationship" among the alleged racketeering acts in determining
whether a RICO defendant engaged in a "pattern of racketeering
activity." 1
Congress enacted RICO in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act (OCCA) 12 to curb organized crime's infiltration of businesses,
labor unions, and government organizations.13 Organized or "enter-
prise" criminality enables criminals to draw on substantial resources to
cultivate illegal schemes and to shield themselves from prosecution. 4
Accordingly, Congress set out to ruin, not simply to regulate, criminal
enterprises. 15
Specifically, Congress aimed RICO's prohibitions at continuing, sys-
tematic criminal conduct.16 Ongoing, interrelated criminal acts, rather
than sporadic acts, warranted the imposition of RICO's severe penal-
ties.17 To reach such systematic conduct, Congress employed the con-
10. 105 S. Ct. at 2181-87. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court rejected both the prior
criminal conviction and racketeering injury requirements. The majority found the Second Circuit's
restrictions unwarranted by RICO's language and legislative history.
11. Id. at 3285 n.14; see infra note 18 (defining pattern of racketeering activity).
12. RICO was enacted as Title IX of OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970).
13. "One of the most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the
fact that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate
legitimate business enterprises." S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951).
14. See S. RPn. No. 617, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 77 (1969). Organized crime's ability to persist in
the face of existing sanctions concerned Congress as well. Id. at 78.
15. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (purpose of RICO is "the eradication of
organized crime."). To this end, RICO includes a forfeiture provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (Supp.
1985), designed to attack organized crime's economic base. See S. RP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 79 (1969). RICO's criminal provisions permit a fine of $25,000 and/or a prison term of up to
twenty years, and forfeiture of any interest in an enterprise "acquired or maintained" through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a).
RICO also includes a civil treble damage provision, see supra note 2, to augment the prosecutorial
attack on organized criminal activity by encouraging private enforcement. S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 79, 82 (1969).
The conduct of organized criminals proved difficult to define, and in Congress' view, necessitated a
statute with broad scope. See 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (noting
the "impossibility" of effectively reaching the commercial activities of organized crime, without in-
cluding "offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well"); see also Com-
ment, Sedima v. Imrex." Civil Immunity for Unprosecuted RICO Violators?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 419,
422-425 (1985) (discussing RICO's objectives).
16. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("The target of [RICO] is thus not
sporadic activity."); see also 116 CONG. REC. 35,193 (1970) ("[RICO] is not aimed at the isolated
offender and it does not use mild remedies.").
17. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970).
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cepts of a "pattern"18 and an "enterprise." 19 Thus, RICO prohibits the
acquisition, maintenance, or operation of an enterprise through apattern
of racketeering activity.2"
Congress struggled to define a "pattern" of racketeering activity. Sec-
tion 1961(5), RICO's definitional section, states that a pattern "requires"
the commission of at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten-
year period.21 A few courts find the use of the word "requires" instead of
"means" to be insignificant. These courts deem the pattern requirement
satisfied by an allegation that meets the literal quantitative and temporal
criteria of section 1961(5).22 Most courts, however, believe that by stat-
ing what a pattern requires, Congress merely limited the "pattern" re-
quirement, leaving to the courts the task of determining what a "pattern"
means.
23
Judicial interpretations of the term "pattern" rely on two notions
drawn from RICO's legislative history: continuity and relationship.24
18. Section 1961(5) provides in pertinent part: "A pattern of racketeering activity requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (1984).
19. Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although
not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (1984); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
584 (1981) (RICO is intended to reach both the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate busi-
nesses, and the investment in and operation of wholly illegal enterprises).
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a)-(d) (1984). Section 1961(1) (A)-(D) enumerates the offenses that
qualify as acts of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(D) (Supp. 1985).
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (1984); see supra note 19. "The concept of 'pattern' is essential to
the operation of the statute." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). The Senate Report
also stressed that "[o]ne isolated racketeering activity [is] insufficient to trigger the remedies pro-
vided under the proposed chapter, largely because the net would be too large and the remedies
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense." Id.
Congress revised the "pattern" definition twice during the course of the debates on the OCCA.
The original definition of a pattern provided: "The term 'pattern of racketeering activity' includes at
least one act occurring after the effective date of this chapter." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
122 (1969) (emphasis added). To avoid sanctioning isolated activity, Congress made the following
revision: "The term 'pattern of racketeering activity' means at least two acts, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this chapter." Id. (emphasis added). The version of § 1961(5) ultimately
enacted provides that a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1961(5) (1984) (emphasis added). See Tarlow, Rico Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 346 (1983)
(calling "pattern" the most "nebulous" term in RICO).
22. See, eg., United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 791 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding RICO con-
viction despite jury instruction providing that: "'Pattern' . . . means two acts .. ") (emphasis
added).
23. See, eg., United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("... the
pattern definition states a minimum but not necessarily an exclusive definition.").
24. The Senate Report provides: "The target of [RICO] is . .. not sporadic activity. The
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In United States v. Elliott,25 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated that a RICO pattern requires "a type of relatedness"
as well as two acts committed within ten years.26 Because RICO prohib-
its the operation of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, the court reasoned that a nexus between the acts and the
enterprise provides the requisite relationship. 7 If the acts of racketeer-
ing activity are linked to a common enterprise, the Elliott court con-
cluded, they need not otherwise be related to each other.28
The court in United States v. Stofsky29 contended that a RICO pattern
contemplates two relationships: an enterprise relationship and a "corn-
infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the
threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (emphasis ad-
ded). Senator McClellan, the sponsor of the Senate bill, also pointed out that "[t]he term 'pattern'
itself requires the showing of a relationship.... So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering
activity, without more, does not establish a pattern .... 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970). The House
did not define "pattern" but noted at least that it meant "not isolated." Organized Crime Control:
Hearings on S. 30 before Subcomm. No. 5 ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
664-65 (1970).
The Supreme Court discussed RICO's pattern requirement in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981). In Turkette, the Court briefly described the pattern requirement in strictly statutory
terms. The Court stated that a pattern of racketeering activity "is proved by evidence of the requi-
site number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise." Id. at 583.
25. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
The court in Elliott confronted an illegal enterprise or "myriopod criminal network" engaged in
diverse racketeering activities including arson, car theft, fencing, narcotics dealing, and the murder
of a key government witness. Conceding that RICO does not aim at sporadic activity, the court
observed that Congress had characterized organized crime as a "highly sophisticated, diversified and
widespread activity," and intended RICO to reach enterprises "nefarious enough to diversify their
criminal activity." Id at 899 (quoting the preamble to OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922
(1970)).
26. 571 F.2d at 899 n.23.
27. Id. The court asserted that the gravamen of a RICO offense is the conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering acts. Id Therefore, the acts need only relate to the enterprise, and
not directly to each other. Id. See Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront" RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 341, 354-55 (1980) (approving Elliot).
28. 571 F.2d at 899 n.23; see also United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Even when courts agree that the enterprise-nexus supplies a sufficient relationship to constitute a
RICO pattern, they require differing degrees of relationship between the acts and the enterprise.
Compare United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (racketeering acts must
relate to the "essential functions" of the enterprise) with United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322,
1333 n.24 (5th Cir. 1983) (acts need only affect the enterprise in some fashion) and United States v.
Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830-31 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring merely "a link" to the enterprise's affairs).
29. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Hoff v. United States, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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mon scheme, plan or motive" connecting the racketeering acts to each
other." Thus, isolated criminal acts committed in the conduct of a com-
mon enterprise could not constitute a pattern." Drawing upon Stofsky's
common-scheme analysis, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Weath-
erspoon 32 held that five separate mailings arising out of a single mail
fraud scheme constituted a pattern. The court reasoned that RICO pros-
cribes a pattern of interrelated acts and does not require multiple
schemes.33
Some courts have found RICO patterns even when interrelated acts
occur in such close proximity that they appear to be elements of a single
transaction or criminal episode. 34  In United States v. Moeller,35 for ex-
ample, the defendants were charged with violating RICO for burning
down a manufacturing plant and kidnapping several employees of the
30. Id. at 614. The court identified three factors supporting this construction. First, it noted
that 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), enacted as part of Title X of OCCA and simultaneously with RICO,
defines a "pattern of criminal conduct" as "criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated events." The court asserted that statutes enacted simultane-
ously and employing the same terms should be construed together. 409 F. Supp. at 614. Second, the
court asserted that despite the "quantitative" language of § 1961(5), Congress' major concern in
enacting RICO was the "special danger to legitimate business of a continuity of racketeering activ-
ity," Id. Third, the court asserted that in light of RICO's severe penalties, see supra note 15, Con-
gress intended a pattern interrelationship requirement to limit the statute's scope. Id.
31. Id. Although United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled Stofsky's
"common scheme" approach, numerous courts subsequently relied on Stofsky. See, eg., United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982) (offenses must be connected by a "scheme");
United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1981) (two or more acts connected in some
logical manner constitute a pattern); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1066
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (separate acts of mail and wire fraud arising out of a "common nucleus of facts"
constitute a pattern); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (acts with
similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission exhibit the required
interrelationship).
32 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Weatherspoon operated a cosmetol-
ogy college for tuition-paying students. Id. at 597. The prosecutor alleged that defendant had used
the mails on five separate occasions to submit false certifications of student enrollment to receive
Veterans Administration reimbursements to which defendant was not otherwise entitled. Id. at 598.
33. Id. at 602. The defendant argued that the mailings were all part of a single scheme to
defraud the VA and that she had committed only one "act," a fraud of the VA, insufficient to form a
pattern. id. at 601. The court rejected the defendant's contention that a pattern requires multiple
schemes. Id. Observing that the acts in a RICO pattern must be connected by a common scheme,
plan or motive, the court argued that requiring two separate schemes for a pattern ignores the rela-
tionship requirement. Id. at 601 n.2.
34. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 18 (2d Cir. 1983) (two acts of securities
fraud as part of a single stock transaction may comprise a pattern); Lopez v. Richards, 594 F. Supp.
488 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (defendants' mailing of a fraudulent investment contract and wiring of plain-
tiffs deposit as part of fraudulent real estate transaction constituted a pattern); Harper v. New Japan
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plant as part of a single scheme to defraud the plant's insurer.36
Although the kidnapping and arson occurred "at the same place on the
same day in the course of the same criminal episode," the court nonethe-
less held that the acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. 37
Acts in single-transaction "patterns" such as in Moeller display the
requisite interrelationship but lack continuity, the other important facet
of a RICO pattern.38 In Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. Erie,39 the court
declined to find a pattern based on a city councilman's acceptance of
several bribes during one evening. Although each bribe related to a sin-
gle fraudulent scheme to influence the award of a franchise, the court
emphasized the absence of a "continuous, ongoing series" of illegal
acts. 4' Conceding that the existence of two independent schemes was
unnecessary, the court nonetheless limited RICO's reach to activities
constituting "a continuous course of unlawful conduct."'"
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,42 the Supreme Court examined for
Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (numerous acts arising out of the same
episode may comprise a pattern).
The validity of single-transaction patterns is often an issue when plaintiffs allege RICO claims in
the context of securities or common-law fraud. Plaintiffs are able, in effect, to bring securities fraud
claims under RICO, because "fraud in the sale of securities" is one of the enumerated racketeering
activities, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (1984 & Supp. 1985), and the issuance, purchase or sale of a
security usually entails the use of an enterprise. Similarly, the inclusion of mail and wire fraud as
racketeering activities makes a RICO claim possible whenever commercial fraud involves use of the
mail or telephone services.
35. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. at 58. The Moeller court found a pattern, but voiced its concern that the multiple
acts/single transaction approach ignored RICO's emphasis on continuing activity. Id. at 57-58.
Acknowledging that the statutory definition established that "a pattern can consist ofonly two acts,"
the Moeller court still thought the commonsense understanding of pattern implied acts occurring in
"different criminal episodes, . . . somewhat separated in time and place yet ... demonstrat[ing] a
continuity of activity." Id. at 57.
38. Other courts have also suggested that a RICO pattern must evidence continuity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.) (RICO's proscription against "conduct of an
enterprise" focuses on continuing activity), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981), rev'd on other grounds,
669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (RICO
"clearly contemplates a prolonged course of conduct"), affid, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (RICO not concerned with "irregulari-
ties" deviating from otherwise lawful conduct).
39. 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
40. Id. at 12-13.
41. Id. at 12.
42. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (5-4). Prior to Sedima, the Supreme Court had considered only two
other RICO cases, both involving criminal RICO charges. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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the first time the scope of private civil RICO. Justice White, writing for
the majority, found that neither the statute nor its legislative history indi-
cated the severe restrictions imposed by the Second Circuit on the use of
civil RICO.43 Justice White conceded that civil RICO frequently
reached "respected businesses" instead of "the archetypal, intimidating
mobster."" However, Justice White identified the failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of a "pattern" as a prin-
cipal cause of civil RICO's unintended applications.45
The Court suggested in a footnote that a RICO pattern must exhibit
"continuity plus relationship."46 Two acts of racketeering activity com-
mitted within ten years are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient to
constitute a pattern.47 Two or more acts may be sufficiently interrelated,
for example, if they have "similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
or methods of commission ... and are not isolated events."
48
Although Justice Powell strongly dissented from the majority's broad
reading of RICO, he agreed with the majority's narrow pattern interpre-
tation, finding it consistent with Congress' "unequivocal intent" to direct
43. 105 S. Ct. at 3285. The Court rejected both the prior criminal conviction and the racketeer-
ing injury requirements. Id. at 3281-87.
44. Id. at 3287.
45. Id. Acknowledging that at least in its civil applications RICO is developing into "some-
thing quite different from the original conception of its enactors," Justice White asserted that this
"defect-if defect it is" is inherent in the statutory language. Id. Justice White left the correction of
the statute to Congress, but suggested that judicial development of a more restrictive RICO pattern
was possible in the existing statutory framework and could operate to limit RICO's extraordinary
applications. Id.
Congress is currently considering two bills which would alter the pattern definition. Both bills
would require that at least one of the racketeering acts in any RICO pattern be an offense other than
mail or wire fraud. In addition, one of the bills, H.R. 2517, would require that the racketeering acts
be "interrelated by a common scheme, plan, or motive" and not be "isolated events." H.R. 2517,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
Congress is also currently considering an amendment to RICO that would require criminal con-
viction for the predicate offenses prior to the instigation of a civil action. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1985. See also Note, RICO's New Community of Racketeers: The Need for a Prior Criminal
Conviction Requirement, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 229 (1986) (advocating an amendment to RICO that
would require a prior criminal RICO conviction of the defendant).
46. 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14 (Court's emphasis).
47. Id. Justice White found that Congress' use of the word "requires" in § 1961(5) left room for
further elaboration of the pattern requirement. Id. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
48. 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. Justice White observed that the definition of a "pattern of criminal
activity" found in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), enacted simultaneously with RICO as part of the
OCCA, might be helpful in construing the meaning of "pattern" in RICO. Id. See supra note 30.
Justice White declined to apply his observations on the RICO pattern to the facts of Sedima
because, in his view, the issue was not before the Court. Id. at 3287.
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RICO at organized criminal activity.49 Thus, Justice Powell agreed that
a RICO pattern requires "something more" than two acts of racketeering
activity. Justice Powell set forth three requirements of a RICO pattern:
(1) the racketeering acts must relate to each other, (2) the acts must be
part of a common scheme, and (3) the acts must display continuity or a
threat of continuing harm.50 Justice Powell feared, however, that the
majority's firm rejection of the restrictions imposed by the Second Cir-
cuit would make future limitations of RICO through a narrow pattern
construction difficult."
Although the Court declined to reach the merits of the pattern issue in
Sedima, the Supreme Court did provide concrete guidance for further
judicial refinements of the "pattern" concept. Both the majority opinion
and Justice Powell's dissenting opinion agree that a RICO pattern re-
quires two interrelated acts.52 Furthermore, both the majority and Jus-
tice Powell agree that the acts must relate to a common scheme.5 3
Therefore two otherwise isolated acts that exhibit an enterprise nexus
will no longer constitute a pattern. 4 After Sedima, courts should also
refuse to apply RICO when the alleged acts do not have common goals,
perpetrators, victims or methods of commission.5
Finally, Sedima suggests that continuity is a necessary element of a
RICO pattern.56 Accordingly, courts should hesitate to apply RICO
when the predicate acts are committed in close succession. 7 The validity
of single-transaction patterns, when the acts extend over a longer period
49. 105 S. Ct. at 3288-90.
50. Id. at 3290; accord REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 193-208 (1985).
51. 105 S. Ct. at 3290. In light of the majority's conclusion that the entire statute should be
read in the spirit of the legislative history, Justice Powell doubted whether courts could heed the
majority's suggestion to develop a more "meaningful" and restrictive RICO pattern. Id.
52. Id. at 3285 n.14 & 3290.
53. Id.
54. For a discussion of the enterprise-nexus requirement for a pattern, see supra notes 25-28
and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of the common-scheme analysis of RICO patterns and Justice White's
adoption of this approach, see supra notes 32-34 & 48 and accompanying text.
56. Both Justices White and Powell mention continuity as a requirement for a RICO pattern.
105 S. Ct. 3285 n.14 & 3290.
57. For a discussion of single-transaction RICO patterns, see supra notes 42-45 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 64:253
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of time, remains unclear.5" The Supreme Court did not indicate how
long criminal activity must persist before it is continuous. The Court's
failure to develop a continuity standard leaves considerable uncertainty
surrounding the meaning of a RICO pattern. 9
Sedima points the way for courts to develop a narrow pattern defini-
tion to preclude certain types of RICO claims. Justice Powell's predic-
tion that the majority opinion goes too far in advocating a broad
construction of other RICO provisions to allow a narrow pattern con-
struction may prove correct. However, the Court's implicit disapproval
of an enterprise-nexus requirement and single-transaction patterns
should nevertheless encourage the development of a more restrictive
RICO pattern.
S.UC.
58. For an argument that single-transaction patterns encompassing longer periods of time evi-
dence continuity and thus survive Sedima, see Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 36, col. 1.
Similarly, Sedima fails to resolve the issue of whether the possibility of future criminal activity, as
well as previous persistent activity, satisfy the continuity requirement. Justice Powell pointed out
that a RICO pattern requires "continuity between the acts or a threat of continuing criminal activ-
ity." 105 S. Ct. at 3290 (emphasis added). Justice White did not explicitly indicate whether a threat
of continuing activity would suffice, but he did cite the Senate Report, which uses the phrase "threat
of continuing activity." See id. at 3285 n.14.
59. The Court's failure to develop a continuity standard leaves the validity of single-transaction
securities or common-law fraud patterns unresolved. Most single-transaction patterns will meet the
common-scheme requirement. A finding of continuity, however, is hard to imagine when, for exam-
ple, two telephone calls made to effect a fraudulent securities sale through material misrepresenta-
tion take place in a single day.
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